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Sherwood and Greer: Mining Law in a Nuclear Age: The Wyoming Example

LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 111

1968

NUMBER 1

Recognizing that expanded activity in hard mineral exploration
and development has exposed a critical need for a modern examination of the mining law of Wyoming, the authors examine the law of
mines and mining on the public domain in this state. In this, the first
of two parts, the authors discuss the appropriation and the form of
permissible appropriations of public mineral lands.

MINING LAW IN A NUCLEAR AGE:
THE WYOMING EXAMPLE t
Don H. Sherwood*
Gary L. Greer**
INTRODUCTION

T

American law of mines and mining on the public
domain was forged in the Nineteenth Century by individual miners lured to the Western frontiers of this nation
by reports of great mineral discoveries.' It was magnificently
HE

t

Copyright@ Don H. Sherwood and Gary L. Greer, 1968. The title is, of
course, suggested by one of the first modern articles on American mining
law: Martz, Pick and Shovel Mining Laws in an Atomic Age: A Case for
Reform, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 375 (1955).
* Associate, Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; B.S.,
1960, LL.B., 1961, University of Nebraska; Order of the Coif; Member of
the Denver, Colorado and American Bar Associations. Mr. Sherwood is
presently Adjunct Professor of Natural Resources Law at the University
of Denver College of Law, and served as Executive Director during 1965-67
of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, of which he is now a
member of the Board of Trustees.
** Associate, Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; A.B.,
1957, Columbia College; LL.B., 1964, University of Colorado; Order of the
Coif; Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Scholar; Member of the
Denver, Colorado and American Bar Associations. Mr. Greer is a Supplement Author of THE AMERICAN LAW OF MINING (1968), and author of
Millsites: Nonmineral Mining Claims, 13 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 143
(1968).
1. These enterprising individuals were in fact trespassers on the public domain;
from 1848 until 1866 Congress, by its silence, acquiesced in the occupation
and exploitation of the public domain by miners who set up their own rules
to govern their individual usufructuary rights. See Swenson, Sources and
Evolution of American Mining Law, in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 1.8,
1.10 (1960). By the Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 1, 14 Stat. 251, the
mineral lands of the public domain were "declared to be free and open to
exploration and occupation," thus authorizing the activities of the miners,
and the express direction contemplated by the Act of July 4, 1866, ch. 166,
§ 5, 14 Stat. 86 (now 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1964)), which provided that "in all
cases lands valuable for minerals shall be reserved from sale, except as
otherwise expressly directed by law," was supplied in the Act of July 26,
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expounded by judges whose names have long since become
legendary,2 and was recorded, with occasional embellishment,
in the classic pages of the last edition of Lindley's justly
famous treatise published in 1914.' Scarcely touched by statutory changes for a generation,4 the mining law languished
until, nearly eclipsed by legislative and judicial response to
other demands of our society,5 it was put to the test of the
nuclear age on the Colorado Plateau.'
The technology of our times, coupled with the burgeoning appetite of an expanding world population for metals
and fissionable materials, has focused increasing attention

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

1866, ch. 262, § 2, 14 Stat. 251, which directed the grant of a patent to an
applicant claiming a lode mine, upon occupation and improvement thereof.
An earlier statute had declared that:
no possessory action between persons, in any court of the United States,
for the recovery of any mining title, or for damages to any such title,
shall be affected by the fact that the paramount title to the land in
which such mines lie is in the United States; but each case shall be
adjudged by the law of possession.
Act of February 27, 1865, ch. 64, § 9, 13 Stat. 440 (now 30 U.S.C. § 53
(1964)). Placer claims were opened to entry and patent by the Act of
July 9, 1570, ch. 235, § 12, 16 Stat. 217. The General Mining Law, although
modified and supplemented from time to time by Congress, was adopted
basically in its present form by the Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1-15,
17 Stat. 91 (now 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1964)).
The names of Mr. Justice Field, Judge Hawley, Judge Hallett, and Judge
Sawyer come readily to mind. Cf., e.g., Riner, Hon. Moses Hallett, 4 WYO.
L. J. 86 (1949).
C. LINDLEY, MINES (3d ed. 1914); examples of the embellishment which has
helped to keep Lindley's text in current use, along with the popular and still
useful handbook originally published by Robert S. Morrison, E. DE SOTO &
A. MORRISON, MORRISON'S MINING RIGHTS (16th ed. 1936) rwhile others, such
as D. BARRINGER & J. ADAMS, LAW OF MINES AND MINING IN THE UNITED
STATES (1897), G. COSTIGAN, MINING LAW (1908) and W. SNYDER, MINES
AND MINING (1902), have fallen into disuse], can be found in 2 C. LINDLEY,
supra, §§ 363, 645A.
The first significant legislation following the Mineral Leasing Act of
February 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (now 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1964),
as amended), was the Multiple Mineral Development Act of Aug. 13, 1954,
Pub. L. No. 83-585, ch. 730, 68 Stat. 708, 30 U.S.C. §§ 521-527 (1964), followed by the Multiple Surface Use Act of July 23, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84167, ch. 375, 69 Stat. 367, amending the Materials Disposal Act of July 31,
1947, ch. 406, 61 Stat. 681 (now combined as 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1964)).
See also Bloomenthal, Multiple Mineral Development on the Public Domain,
9 Wyo. L.J. 139 (1955), and Barry, Determination of What Constitutes
"Common Varieties," 12 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 225 (1967). Some of
the Congressional enactments of the late Forties, e.g., Act of June 21, 1949,
ch. 232, §§ 1-4, 63 Stat. 214 (now 30 U.S.C. §§ 28b-e (1964), Act of June
17, 1949, ch. 221, § 2, 63 Stat. 201, and Act of June 21, 1949, ch. 232, . 5,
63 Stat. 215 (now 30 U.S.C. § 54) (1964)), are of some interest, and illustrate the change in attitude toward some of the mining laws.
See Martz, Preface to 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING at vii (1960), and
compare Preface to E. DE Soro & A. MORRISON, MORRISON'S MINING RIGHTS,
supra note 3, at iii.
Martz, Pick and Shovel Mining Laws in an Atomic Age: A Case for Reforn,
27 ROCKY MT. L. Rsv. 375 (1955); Cf. Waldeck, Discovery Requirements and
Rights Priorto Discovery on Uranium Claims on the Colorado Plateau, 27
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 404 (1955), and Note, Valuable Mineral Discovery, 9
Wyo. L. J. 214 (1955).
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upon the mining laws.' Once the sacrosanct institution of a
basic industry,' it has become fashionable even for mining
lawyers to suggest reforms.' But what began as an appeal
for an accommodation with the Atomic Age" has become an
open demand, primarily by Government land administrators,
for outright repeal of the mining laws.11 Lost, perhaps, in
the midst of the wealth of recent literature debating the
merits of the various suggested reforms is the mining law
itself, born of similar controversy a century ago. 2
In most public domain"3 states, such as Wyoming, the
mining law is a composite of the General Mining Law of
1872, as amended and supplemented by Congress, 4 and state
law. 5 This dual regulation of mines and mining on Federal
7. See, e.g., University of Arizona College of Mines, Symposium on American
Mineral Law Relating to Public Land Use, March 21-23, 1966 (Bound
Pamphlet edited by J. Dotson).
8. See Gray, New Concept of Discovery and Title to Unpatented Mining Claims,
10 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 491 (1965).
9. See, e.g., Twitty, Amendments to the Mining Laws, 8 ARIZ. L. REV. 63
(1966).
10. Martz, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Remarks of Under Secretary of the Interior Charles F. Luce before
American Mining Congress Coal Show, Cleveland, Ohio, May 15, 1967
(U.S. Dep't of the Interior News Release, May 15, 1967); Barry, Discovery
Under the Mining Laws, 8 ARIZ. L. REV. 84 (1966) (indicating, Id. at 85,
that public lands are now "Government lands" which "are closely guarded"),
and compare O'Callaghan, The Mining Law and Multiple Use, 7 NATURAL
REsouRCES J. 242 (1967), Senzel, Administration of the Mining Laws in
Areas of Conflict, 7 NATURAL REsouRcEs J.225 (1967), Stoddard & O'Callaghan, Creative Federalism and the Retention or Disposition of Public
Lands, 8 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 (1966), Barry, supra note 4, and Hoehmuth,
Government Administration and Attitudes in Contest and Patent Proceedings, 10 RocxY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 467 (1965), with 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF MINING § 4.26 at 642-645 (1960).
12. Swenson, supra note 1, § 1.12.
13. We adopt, for the purposes of this paper, the definition of "public domain"
supplied by Professor Swenson, supra note 1, § 1.6 at 11, which excludes
"land acquired from private individuals or the states usually referred to
as 'acquired lands'" from the remaining lands ceded to the United States
in the West. Although we prefer to refer to Federal lands still open to
entry, at least under the mining laws, as "public lands," to distinguish
them from "reserved lands" not open to such entry, the applicability of
the mining laws to some types of reservations, e.g., National Forests, 16
U.S.C. §§ 478, 482 (1964), some National Monuments, e.g., Death Valley
National Monument, 16 U.S.C. § 447 (1964), power site reservations, 30
U.S.C. §§ 621-625 (1964), and even some National Parks, e.g., Mount
McKinley National Park, 30 U.S.C. §§ 350, 350a (1964), prohibits a ready
distinction between the terms "public lands" and "public domain," and we
will use the two terms interchangeably. Some states thought of as public
domain states, e.g., Nebraska, Swenson, supra note 1, § 1.20, do not have
mining legislation supplementary to the General Mining Law of 1872.
14. The Bureau of Land Management of the United States Department of the
Interior has adopted some regulations concerning mining claims, see 43
C.F.R. Part 3400 (1967), but, with some exceptions, notably with respect
to patent applications and surveys for patents, 43 C.F.R. Subparts 34403480 (1967), these are directory rather than mandatory.
15. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964) with 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 26, and 43 (1964), and
see Swenson, supra note 1, § 1.22. Although Federal law still permits the
adoption by local mining districts of regulations "not in conflict with the
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lands is undoubtedly one of the outstanding features of
American mining law,"6 and the deliberate failure of Congress to pre-empt the field" has permitted, if not encouraged,
variations in state legislation" and judicial interpretations.)
Thus, any lawyer representing or employed by the enterprising miner of today-generally companies with the resources
to engage in long-odds exploration gambling and to invest
the astronomical sums2" required in the development of deeply
buried and often low-grade mineral deposits-must recognize
and appreciate significant variations in the mining laws and
precedents of the different Western states.2 '

16.
17.

18.

19.
20.
21.

laws of the United States, or with the laws of the State . .. in which the
district is situated," 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), such local districts are of little,
if any, significance today. Wyoming provided for the organization of
mining districts in its first mining legislation, Law of Dec. 2, 1869, ch. 22,
§§ 20-23, [1869] Wyo. Laws 311-312 (repealed 1873), and later legislation,
Law of Nov. 26, 1879, ch. 57, §§ 1-2, [1879] Wyo. Laws 115, amended by
Law of March 9, 1882, ch. 71, § 1, [1882] Wyo. Laws 157 (repealed 1888),
and Law of March 6, 1888, ch. 40, §§ 1-3, [1888], Wyo. Laws 83-84, was
finally repealed in 1957, Law of Febr. 11, 1957, ch. 96, § 1, [1957] Wyo.
Laws 109, following the decision in State ex rel. Blonder v. Goodbrod, 77
Wyo. 126, 307 P.2d 1073 (1957). But nothing in the 1957 law "shall affect
the validity of any mining district heretofore formed in conformity with
the law in effect at the time of the formation of said district." Law of
Fehr. 11, 1957, ch. 96, § 2, [1957] Wyo. Laws 109. Compare Law of Nov.
26, 1869, ch. 51, § 1, [1869] Wyo. Laws 413 (last codified in Wyo. COMP.
STAT. § 4657 (1920), and repealed in 1931), validating certain records of
the early Shoshone and California Mining Districts. The Goodbrod case
involved a recent attempt by miners and landowners in Campbell County
to organize a mining district under the provisions of the statute then in
force, WYo. CoMP. STAT. § 57-901 (1945), and to adopt regulations which
imposed upon prospective locators certain prospecting and district recording fees, required assignments of overriding royalties and participation
rights to holders of surface interests, and required the filing of claims
with a district recorder. The Court found the district regulations to be in
conflict with state law requiring the recording of location certificates only
in official county records and held the regulations invalid.
Compare Swenson, supra note 1, § 1.22, with 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES §§ 248-264
(3d ed. 1914).
Recent Acts of Congress, e.g., Act of Aug. 23, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-736,
§ 1, 72 Stat. 829, amending the assessment-work statute, 30 U.S.C. § 28,
(1964); Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-876, §§ 1-2, 72 Stat. 1701 (now
30 U.S.C. §§ 28-1 and 28-2 (1964)), and Act of Mar. 18, 1960, Pub. L.
No. 86-390, 74 Stat. 7, amending the "millsite" statute, 30 U.S.C. § 42 (1964),
have left intact the permission granted to the states to enact complementary
legislation. 30 U.S.C. H 22, 26 and 28 (1964).
Compare, e.g., Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-6 and 30-7 (1957) with COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 92-22-6 and 92-22-9 (1963). But see IDAHO CODE § 47-603A (1948, 1967
Supp.) and NEw MEX. STAT. ANN. §§ 63-2-3.1 to 63-2-3.3 (1953); 1960
Repl. and 1967 Supp.).
Compare, e.g., Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 44, 291 P.2d 810 (1955), with Moorhead v. Erie Mining & Milling Co., 43 Colo. 408, 96 P.253 (1908), and
Emerson v. Akin, 26 Colo. App. 140 P. 481 (1914).
See MacMillan, Management Views of the Areas of Legal Conflict, 12
Rocy MT.MiNmAL L. INST. 171, 176 (1967).
The danger in relying upon the law of sister states in mining cases is well
illustrated in Iba v. Central Ass'n of Wyoming, 5 Wyo. 355, 40 P.527, 5 Wyo.
367, 42 P.20 (1895), where the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected authorities
from Colorado on procedural grounds. See also Bergquist v. West VirginiaWyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P.673 (1910), in which the lack of
uniformity among the mining laws of several states is discussed.
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The basic tools of the mining lawyer, having been designed for what might be called the general practice of mining
law," offer little in the way of specific coverage of the law
in any one jurisdiction.2 8 Furthermore, the courts have not
been idle in the years since 1914. While Congress and the
state legislatures avoided statutory revisions until the mid
Fifties" the courts had already begun the process, which is
continuing, of accommodating Lindley's law to the nuclear
age.2

Our purpose in this study is to collect and examine the
Federal and state law of one jurisdiction and to determine
the extent to which innovation has occurred in the law of
mines and mining on the public domain in the years since
publication of Lindley's last edition. If, in the process, we
offer the wide-ranging second-century mining lawyer a more
precise and yet modern example of the development of American mining law in one jurisdiction, the limitation inherent26
22. See, e.g., Preface to E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, MINING RIGHTS, supra note
3, at iii, and Preface to First Edition, I C. LINDLEY, supra note 3, at vii,
X-Xi.

23. The best comparative material of which we are aware appears in the
tables in F. TRELEASE, H. BLOOMENTHAL & J. GERAUD, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 477-478, 484-485, 492-493, 508-509, and 529 (1965).
24. See Swenson, supra note 1, §§ 1.34-1.44, and compare, e.g., Law of Febr. 11,
1955, ch. 88, §§ 1-2, [1955] Wyo. Laws 77-79, and Law of Febr. 1, 1957, ch.
25, § 1, [1957] Wyo. Laws 19-20. The Wyoming Legislature adopted no
public-land mining legislation between the Law of Febr. 19, 1901, ch. 100,
§§ 1-5, [1901] Wyo. Laws 104-105, and the Law of Febr. 1, 1951, ch. 18,
§§ 1-4, [1951] Wyo. Laws 25-26.
25. See, e.g., Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957);
Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1960);
Rummell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 653 (1958); Dallas v. Fitzsimmons, 137 Colo. 196, 323 P.2d 274 (1958); and Berto v. Wilson, 74 Nev.
128, 324 P.2d 843 (1958).
26. We would define the inherent limitation as something more than an inability
to analyze all the cases; American mining law developed in response to the
discovery of mineral deposits not often found in Wyoming, and the greatest
number of Wyoming cases involve mineral deposits such as bentonite,
uranium ores, and oil and gas, which were not found in the State in the
geological structures which formed the characteristic background leading
to the bulk of the reported litigation from beyond the State. Thus, a
general examination of Wyoming mining law may not be readily applicable
in the context of other mineral deposits in other states, and, conversely,
the law of other states is not always framed in such a way that we can
assume it should be applicable in the situations discussed by the Wyoming
courts. Wyoming oil placer cases, for example, may have their counterparts
in California, but they may be as inappropriate to a case involving steeplydipping silver veins in the Coeur d'Alenes of Idaho as the early Idaho cases
were found to be to the Leadville cases in Colorado. See E. DE SoTo & A.
MORRISON, supra note 3, at 202-203. We do not, therefore, attempt to make
a comparative analysis of cases arising under the same or similar laws
but different physical situations.
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in the approach may yield a product useful to Wyoming lawyers as well.2 7
APPROPRIATION OF LOCATABLE

PUBLIC

LANDS

A mining claim2 8 may be located only on unappropriated
or locatable public domain.29 The term "unappropriated
public domain" comprehends both that publicly owned mineral land"° has not by Congressional authority or Executive
withdrawal under such authority been reserved and segregated from mineral entry3 ' or in some manner withdrawn
27. The sheer bulk of reported litigation and the partially comparable statutory
materials in states other than Wyoming prohibit any comprehensive analysis
in this study of similarities and disparities between Wyoming law and the
laws of other Western States. But see the tables cited supra note 23.
28. Congress confirmed, in 1866, the right of citizens of the United States, and
those who had declared their intention to become such, freely to explore
and occupy the mineral lands of the public domain, Act of July 26, 1866,
ch. 262, § 1, 14 Stat. 251, and since May 10, 1872, this license to search
for and appropriate "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to
the United States," by exploration and purchase, "and the lands in which
they are found" by "occupation and purchase," Act of May 10, 1872, ch.
85, § 1, 41 Stat. 437 (now 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964)), has been well established. Congress simply adopted the practice which the early miners had
themselves followed in the years from 1848 to 1866 by which the first to
make a discovery of a valuable mineral deposit obtained the right to
continue development of his find, C. MARTZ, CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES
467 (1951), and granted the right to obtain fee title to the mine discovered
as well. See supra note 1. The "appropriation" is initiated upon such a
discovery by the location of a mining claim, it is the acts of the discoverer
locating such a claim which constitute the "taking up" or segregation of
the lands and the mineral deposit itself from the public domain. Slothower
v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P.36 (1906). The nature of the claim or "location" itself depends upon the type of deposit discovered, and may be
either in the form of a lode claim under 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964), or a placer
claim under 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). Nonmineral public lands used or
occupied for mining or milling purposes may be located as a "millsite"
claim under 30 U.S.C. § 42 (1964). The only type of claim which can
be validly located in advance of the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit
is a "tunnel-site" claim located for exploratory purposes under 30 U.S.C.
§ 27 (1964). Provision is also made in the statutes for the location of a
lode within a placer claim, 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1964), and for development
tunnels, 30 U.S.C. §§ 27, 28 and 43 (1964), but these features of the law
are not well defined.
29. See Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P.856 (1908), and Slothower v. Hunter,
15 Wyo.189, 88 P.36 (1906).
30. Lands "belonging to the United States," containing "valuable mineral
deposits," 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), "reserved from sale, except as otherwise
expressly directed by law." 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). The latter statute,
which was adopted earlier than the express direction of 30 U.S.C. § 22
(1964), see note 1, supra, refers to "lands valuable for minerals" rather
than "valuable mineral deposits in lands." For the purposes of location
under the mining laws, we see no practical distinction between the wording
of the two sections.
31. Reservations, at least by Congress, are permitted under the exception in
30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964): "Except as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral
deposits .. .shall be free and open. . . ." But see United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1914), extending the exception to executive withdrawals notwithstanding the United States Constitution, art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2, which provides that it is the Congress, rather than the Executive
branch of the Government which "shall have the Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the . . Property belong-
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from mineral entry, 2 and that it is not possessed by anyone
who has made a previous, valid discovery and location." Just
as not every type of reservation"4 or withdrawal 5 prohibits
locations under the mining laws, so certain forms of entry
by individuals onto the public 'domain do not appropriate
the land so as to withdraw it from subsequent location under
the mining law.8
An example of Federal-law restrictions on mining activity on the public domain would be an Executive withdrawal
from non-metalliferous mining locations under the Pickett
Act of 191V' Attempted locations of mining claims wholly
within an area entirely withdrawn are void and are not
given vitality by the restoration of a withdrawn area :8
Although one writer cites two department 'decisions
to the contrary . . . , it is generally assumed that

a mining location made on land which has been withdrawn from the location laws is void. Even restoration of the land will not validate the claim so as to
give the locator priority from the date of the first
location.
A representative case is Day Mines Inc.,"9 where thirteen
claims made after withdrawal of the land for power site
purposes were held null and void. Similarly, in United States
v. McCutchen,40 a claimant attempted to initiate a location
on land which had been previously withdrawn by Executive

32.
33.
34.
35.

ing to the United States." As to the distinction between withdrawals
and reservations, compare, e.g., the Pickett Act of 1910, 43 U.S.C. § 141
(1964), with the Act creating the Yellowstone National Park reservation,
16 U.S.C. §§ 21-40c (1964), and the more recent Act creating Rocky
Mountain National Park, 16 U.S.C. §§ 191-198d (1964). Cf. B. HIBBARD,
A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 529 (Gates ed. 1965).
Lockhart v. Johnson, 181 U.S. 516 (1901); cf. United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1914); Le Clair v. Hawley, 18 Wyo. 23, 102 P.853
(1909). See also supra note 31.
Belk v. Meagher, 164 U.S. 279 (1881); San Francisco Chem. Co. v. Duffield,
201 F.S30 (D. Wyo. 1912); Le Clair v. Hawley, 18 Wyo. 23, 102 P.853
(1909); Slothower v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P.36 (1906).
See supra note 13.
E.g., withdrawals by the Executive under the Pickett Act of 1910, 43 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1964), which do not prohibit locations of metalliferous mineral

deposits.

36. See Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948), as to the location
of mining claims on grazing permits and stockraising homesteads. Similarly, as to some types of attempted or purported entries under the mining
laws, see Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P.849 (1908). See also 30 U.S.C.
§ 37 (1964), and Inyo Marble Co. v. Loundagin, 120 Cal. App. 298, 7 P.2d
1067 (1932), with respect to lodes located within placer claims.
37. 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
38. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 1.33 (1960).
39. 65 Interior Dec. 145 (1958).
40. 234 F.702 (D. Calif. 1915).
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order on September 27, 1909. In two instances in McCutchen
it was quite clear that locations within the withdrawn area
were made after withdrawal and the Court held these void
ab initio.
A frequent question in withdrawal cases is whether a
locator who entered land and began working toward a discovery of mineral prior to the 'date of a withdrawal, but who
made his discovery thereafter, is protected. United States
v. Ohio Oil Company," was a suit in equity by the United
States to have lands declared withdrawn as of May 6, 1914,
the date of a Presidential withdrawal order, and to quiet
title against the defendant Ohio Oil Company. Defense to
the suit was based upon the right of location prior to the
date of the withdrawal order. In 1913 the oil placer claimants
commenced drilling a prospect well on the land in question.
The well was drilled to a depth of sixty-five feet. There was
evidence that oil was discovered in the well. Later in the
same year a second well was drilled to a depth of fifty-seven
feet and the claimants testified that they found oil therein.
Witnesses for the claimants also testified that the oil found
by the claimants was of sufficient quantity and quality to
justify a person of ordinary prudence in making further
expenditures of money and labor with the reasonable prospect
of success in developing a valuable deposit of oil. 2 Government witnesses testified that nine or ten months after the
drill holes were put in, they examined them by dropping to
the bottom of the wells a line to which was attached a weighted
can, and that in one well were found no indications of oil
and that in the other there was an oily substance more like
gasoline or kerosene than crude oil such as had been found
elsewhere in the district.
On May 6, 1914, the area was withdrawn by the Presidential order. Subsequently, the claimants expended $22,000
in drilling and construction of a permanent camp and $15,000
for the construction of a steel tank in which to store oil. The
facts as stated by the trial court are silent as to whether
there was oil production at the time suit was brought. Judge
Riner held that the claimants had made a discovery prior to
41. 240 F.996 (D. Wyo. 1916).
42. Compare Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 332 (1905); Castle v. Womble,
19 Interior Dec. 455, 457 (1894).
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the withdrawal date, May 6, 1914, but that in any event, the
claimants were in possession and diligently prosecuting work
toward a discovery at the time of the withdrawal and were
bona fide occupants or claimants at that time.4" According
to the terms of the Pickett Act, their rights were not affected
or impaired by the order of withdrawal.
A similar decision was reached in the Eighth Circuit in
a companion case,44 where the Court of Appeals said that it
was unnecesasry to determine whether or not a discovery
had been made prior to May 6, 1914, because the defendants
at the date of the order of withdrawal were bona fide occupants or claimants of the withdrawn lands and were engaged
in diligent prosecution of work leading to the discovery of
oil, and continued thereafter in diligent prosecution of said
work until oil was discovered. The court pointed out that
the Pickett Act contains a proviso protecting the rights of
any person who at the date of a withdrawal is a bona fide
occupant or claimant of oil or gas bearing lands and who
is in diligent prosecution of work leading to discovery of
oil or gas, so long as he shall continue in diligent prosecution
of said work. In construing the Pickett Act, the court said:
Before the enactment of this statute discovery of the
mineral was essential to make a location. As frequently, in fact most instances, prosecuting was
necessary in order to determine whether oil or gas
are on the public lands, and large sums of money
were necessarily expended to ascertain this fact,
Congress by this proviso in the Act of 1910 extended
its protecting arm to those acting in good faith in
an effort to ascertain whether there was oil or gas
under them. In our opinion, when a citizen of the
United States, in good faith enters upon public land
for the purpose of discovering oil or gas, takes possession of the land by placing a caretaker thereon
while he is taking proper steps to obtain the material
necessary for the work of constructing the camps,
enters into contracts for drilling, acting as expeditiously as possible in erecting camps and preparing
for the drilling, spends money and enters into contracts whereby he becomes liable for sums of money
to prosecute the work leading to the discovery of
43. Compare Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P.856 (1908); Whiting v. Straup,
17 Wyo. 1, 95 P.849 (1908).
44. United States v. Grass Creek Oil & Gas Co., 236 F.481 (8th Cir. 1916).
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oil or gas, and as soon as it is possible, by the exercise
of proper diligence, begins the work of drilling, and
continues it diligently and expeditiously until oil is
discovered in commercial quantities, he is within the
protection of this proviso. 5
Absent such a proviso in a Congressional reservation, or
in an Executive order withdrawing land from mineral entry
under the implied powers of the President,"' subject only to
valid existing claims, the Interior Department would find no
difficulty in treating the license to explore as revoked, and
the diligent prosecution of work toward a discovery as
unavailing."
The opposite sort of situation arose in Le Clair v.
Hawley," where land segregated from entry as part of an
Indian reservation was ceded to the United States and opened
to entry under the mining laws by Act of Congress49 after
the expiration of sixty days from the date of a Presidential
proclamation if undisposed of under other disposition provisions of the Act during that period. Entry and occupation
under the mining laws was forbidden during that period, but
Hawley went on the land anyway, found a lode and stood by
on and near it, ready to locate a mining claim when the sixty
days had expired. He located his claim on the sixty-first
45. Id. at 487.
46. Recognized in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1914), as
an inherent power acquiesced in by Congress and separate from that
authorized by the Pickett Act of 1910, 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 65 Interior Dec. 1, 5-6 (1958), where the
Deputy Solicitor said, in connection with contest charges filed against a
mining claim by the Government, that it is unnecessary for the claimant
to show discovery prior to the date of the location of the claims. Under
the mining laws, one may take possession of vacant public land open
to location under those laws and, after filing notice of location, retain
that possession against all except the Government while he is in diligent
prosecution of his efforts to discover valuable minerals therein. While
he is in possession of the land, he is not regarded as a trespasser
because he is on the land with the tacit consent of the Government.
However, when the Government withdraws that consent, either by
withdrawing the land from the operation of the mining laws or by
the institution of adverse proceedings against the claims, the locator
must show that he has made a discovery of valuable mineral deposits
within the limits of the claim in order to retain his possession. When
the Government withdraws the land, a discovery after the withdrawal
will not serve to validate the claim. However, when adverse proceedings are instituted against a claim involving land which remains open
to the operation of the mining laws, discovery may be proved, even
though that discovery may have been made after adverse proceedings
have been started and such a discovery will permit the locator to
retain possession of the land, all else being regular, and in the absence
of a withdrawal of the land in the interim.
48. 18 Wyo. 23, 102 P.853 (1909).
49. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016.
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day, reckoning the day of the proclamation as the first day
(on the sixtieth day, however, if the day of the proclamation
were not included in the calculation), and Le Clair located
the next day. The Court held the first location to have been
made after the expiration of the sixty days, and good against
Le Clair, despite the "occupation" by Hawley prior to location. Had the location been made before the ground was open
to appropriation, however, Hawley would have been premature and his location void.5"
The question of whether mineral lands may be appropriated, then, depends on whether they are open to entry at
the time of the acts of location ;5" if open, and vacant and unoccupied, when a locator initiates his claim, he will be
protected 3 while proceeding toward a discovery with reasonable diligence, and his possession will be protected to the
extent of the surface claimed5 4 against attempted locations
initiated in trespass against his right to complete his location
by making the requisite discovery." When a 'discovery has
been made, and the acts of location completed, the ground
is segregated against other entries,"6 including those by
persons who attempted location earlier, but made no discovery and failed to maintain possession and prosecute their
work with reasonable diligence. 7 The rules are consistent
50. See Kendall v. San Juan Silver Mining Co., 144 U.S. 658 (1892); compare
Mandell v. Great Lakes Oil & Chem. Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 621, 310 P.2d
498 (1957), which accords with the position adopted in Le Clair by the
Wyoming Supreme Court; cf. Griffith v. Noonan, 58 Wyo. 395, 133 P.2d
375 (1943).
51. Le Clair v. Hawley, 18 Wyo. 23, 102 P.853 (1909).
52. Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P.856 (1908); Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo.
1, 95 P.849 (1908).
53. Compare Van Horn v. State, 5 Wyo. 501, 40 P.964 (1895), where an individual was prosecuted under the Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 18,
[1886] Wyo. Laws 446 (repealed and reenacted by Law of Mar. 6, 1888,
ch. 40, §§ 10, 26, [1888] Wyo. Laws 86 and 91, now codified as Wyo. STAT.
§ 30-21 (1957)), for destroying a building on a mining claim. The court
held that the validity of the underlying mining claim need not be established by the State, it being no defense that the location, if located in good
faith, might lack a discovery. It is, of course, the destruction that is
proscribed, but the principle of good faith location and occupation is the
same as in the cases involving diligent prosecution of work toward a
discovery.
54. Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P.856 (1908); accord, Adams v. Benedict,
64 N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308 (1958).
55. Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P.856 (1908); of. Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P.673 (1910).
56. Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P.673
(1910); Le Clair v. Hawley, 18 Wyo. 23, 102 P.853 (1909); Slothower v.
Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P.36 (1906) ; Wright v. Town of Hartville, 13 Wyo.
497, 81 P.649, 13 Wyo. 497, 82 P.450 (1905); Columbia Copper Mining Co.
v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 13 Wyo. 244, 79 P.385 (1905).
57. Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P.849 (1908).
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with the object of the mining laws, which are intended to
promote the exploration and appropriation of the public
mineral lands,5" and designed to reward the diligent."
FoRM OF LOCATION:
LODE AND PLACER CLAIMS AND THE GLOBE CASE

The Federal mining law6" provides for the location of

mining claims "upon veins or lodes of quartz or other rock
in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or

other valuable deposits," and also for the location of "claims
usually called 'placers,' including all forms of deposit, excepting veins of quartz, or other rock in place."'" These
two provisions, taken together, embody the statutory scheme
for classifying lands into two categories and creating distinct
methods for the appropriation of each. 2 Judge Pickett of
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals described the classification as follows :6

Thus it clearly appears that the plan of this
legislation was to provide two general methods of
purchasing mineral deposits from the United States
-one by lode mining claims where the valuable
deposits sought were in lodes or veins in rock in
place, and the other by placer mining claims where
the deposits were not in veins or lodes in rock in
place, but were loose, scattered, or disseminated upon
or under the surface of the land.
58. Id.
59. 30 U.S.C. §§ 23, 28 (1964). Cf. Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708 (D. Utah 1965).
60. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964).
61. 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
62. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1964), providing for situations where lodes are
found or known to exist within placer claims. See Inyo Marble Co. v.
Loundagin, 120 Cal. App. 298, 7 P.2d 1067 (1932), and F. TRELEASE, H.
B3LOOMENTHAL & J. GERAUD, supra note 23, at 602-613. At least one court
has confused the statutory language in 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1964) regarding
"a vein or lode .. .known to exist within the boundaries of a placer claim"
or "a vein or lode included within the boundaries" of a placer claim, with
the "possession of the vein or lode claim" located thereon. See Bowen v.
Chemi-Cote Perlite Corp., 423 P.2d 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). But the
erroneous decision in that case, in which both the lode locator and the
subsequent placer locator were locating the ground for the same mineral
deposit, was reversed in Bowen v. Chemi-Cote Perlite Corp., 432 P.2d 435
(Ariz. 1967), the Arizona Supreme Court refusing to equate "known lode"
with "known lode claim." Both decisions are unsatisfactory in other particulars, but indicate the confusion in concepts to which the mining law is
so susceptible.
63. Titanium Actynite Industries v. McLennan, 272 F.2d 667, 670 (10th Cir.
1959). See also Webb v. American Asphaltum Mining Co., 157 F. 203 (8th
Cir. 1907); Henderson v. Fulton, 35 L.D. 652 (1907) ; 2 C. LINDLEY, MINES
§ 323 (3d ed. 1914).
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Since the statute presents alternatives to the prospective
miner, it is apparent that he is faced with making a choice
between a lode location and a placer location for the particular mine which he proposes to develop. There is good
authority to the effect that the miner makes this choice at
his peril because the discovery of a mineral deposit which
falls within the statutory classification of a lode will not
support a placer location and vice versa."
San Francisco Chem. Co. v. Duffield65 was an action
brought by a junior lo'de locator in support of his adverse
to a patent application made by a senior placer locator.
Predecessors of the defendant San Francisco Chemical Company had located placer claims for phosphate deposits lying
in horizontal beds in Uinta County, Wyoming, in 1905. The
plaintiff Duffield located the same ground as lodes in 1907.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant fully complied with the
requirements of law as to the acts of location. The defendant
applied for a patent for its placer claims, which prompted the
suit. On trial of the case the district court for Wyoming
entered decrees for the plaintiff and the Chemical Company
appealed, contending that it was prior in time to the plaintiff,
and that the plaintiff was a trespasser and could therefore
have initiated no rights in the public domain. The Company
further contended that the trial court erroneously considered
whether the public domain is locatable as lodes or as placers
for the reason that such a decision is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the land department. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decree for the plaintiff, holding that horizontal phosphate beds were locatable only as
lodes and that the defendant's prior location of the ground
as placers was a mere nullity. The court first decided that
the trial court properly inquired into the manner in which
the parties located and that the court had jurisdiction to
decide whether the parties' locations were made upon faulty
choices of the alternatives of lode and placer."6 The court
64. Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286 (1920).
65. 201 F.830 (8th Cir. 1912).
66. Compare Wright v. Town of Hartville, 13 Wyo. 497, 81 P. 649, 82 P. 450
(1905), where the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the state courts are
without jurisdiction to determine, an adverse proceeding under what is now
30 U.S.C. § 30 (1964) (since amended), a dispute between a lode claimant
and a town claiming the same ground under a townsite patent, saying, Id.,
81 P. at 650:
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then went on to hold that phosphate lands lying in horizontal
beds were not locatable as placers. The court noted that the
rock in question was found in horizontal veins or blanket
veins, in place, having a dip and a strike, and further that
the veins were firmly fixed in the mass of the mountain with
well defined lines of demarcation between overlying and
underlying country rock. The court was persuaded in part
that the phosphate rock was a lode by reason of the fact
that it is mined by blasting, that is, in the same manner
as other veins of ore are mined. Having decided that the
mineral was properly locatable as a lode, the court concluded that the defendant's prior placer claims were invalid
and that they initiated no right to possession in the defendant's predecessors. Therefore, the court determined that
the plaintiff rightfully entered and located the lands as lodes.
In the later case of Duffield v. San FranciscoChem. Co., 7
it was said that any scheme to locate lodes as placers is a
fraud on the government and the locations were void, both
as against the government and as against a third party
attempting to make a valid lode location. This has also been
the position of the Interior Department. 8
It has been said that a mistake by the miner in choosing
the form of location should not be fatal, and it does seem
unfair to fault a locator who makes an honest mistake in
selecting the form of location for his mineral discovery. 9
Although it is doubtful that a wrong choice would support an
application for patent, the American Law of Mining writer
suggests that as against subsequent locators the first locator,
even though he has made an improper form of location, may
The entire disposal of the public lands of the United States under the
laws enacted by Congress is placed in the Land Department of the
government. This department is the court of last resort in determining
questions of fact between contesting claimants with respect to their
rights in acquiring any of the public lands. The rule is universal
that when the question of the character of the land is in issue it is
one for the Land Department to decide, and not for the courts. We
cannot conceive of a court determining the right of possession, as in the
case at bar, between a town site patentee and a mining claimant,
without first arriving at a decision as to the character of the land
involved.
67. 205 F.480 (9th Cir. 1913).
68. Helen v. Wells, 54 Interior Dec. 306 (1933). The reason, of course, is that
lode claims must be purchased at the rate of $5.00 per acre of surface
ground located, 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964), while the surface ground located in
a placer claim can be purchased for $2.50 per acre. 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1964).
69. See 1 AMEICAN LAW OF MINING § 4.23 (1960).
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be favored by the courts." If such a tendency in the courts
does exist, it has not been often expressed as a principle.
However, in one remarkable case a state court upheld a
senior lode claim located on placer ground against the claim
of subsequent placer locators even though the court was
aware that the lode locator had made no proper discovery.71
Whatever the risk of improper selection of the form
of location may be, it is important to make a correct choice
in order to secure the maximum rights available under the
mining laws. Because of differences in the nature of the
estates granted and the rights received under the two forms
of location, the miner should select that form which comports
with the statutory classification of the mineral deposit and
which will provide operating rights best suited to his proposed method of mining. He should not only be aware of
the requirements for the validity of his choice, but he should
be aware of the different consequences which flow from his
choice. The statutes express certain differences in the size
of the area obtainable,72 the price to be paid per acre,7" and
in physical requirements for location procedure."' Other
substantial differences exist. Extralateral rights may appertain to lode locations, but not to placer locations."5 Another
important consequence of the choice between lode or placer
location is that different rules have been applied to each
in the situation where excess surface land has been claimed.
In the case of lo'de locators it has been held that a subsequent
locator may measure the ground, cast off and locate the
excess.7 As to placer locations on unsurveyed lands, it has
been held that a locator of excessive area has a right to
select that part which is to be cast off and that until he
has been made aware of the existence of such excess and has
been afforded a reasonable time to exercise his right of selection, no relocation of any part of the ground will be
permitted."
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.

See Springer v. Southern Pac. R.R., 67 Utah 590, 248 P.819 (1926).
Compare 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964) with 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
See supra note 68, 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1964).
Compare Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-1, 30-3 (1957), with WYo. STAT. § 30-10 (1957).
See 2 C. LINDLEY, supra note 63, § 619.
Flynn Group Mining Co. v. Murphy, 18 Idaho 266, 109 P.851 (1910). But
see the extraordinary decision in Velasco v. Mallory, 427 P.2d 540 (Ariz.
App. 1967).
77. See 2 C. LNDLEY, supra note 63, § 362, at 828-830.
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Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson" illustrates the importance of the determination of the lode or placer nature of
mineral land. The plaintiff Globe Mining Company relied
on a discovery of uranium within sandstone layers in the
Wind River formation, a coarse sandstone lying in a relatively horizontal bed. The sandstone outcropped over or
along a ridge covered by claims located by plaintiff's predecessors. The uranium seems to have occurred in a "disseminated uranium deposit of epigenetic origin . . . ." That
is, the deposits of uranium were "carried into the formation
by some solution after the host rock was laid, "" or "deposited
epigenetically, i.e., by mineral in solution (a) permcating
between grains and crystals of the country rock, (b) replacing certain existing formations, and (c) filling cracks, crevices and pore spaces-after the surrounding rock had been
laid down," resulting in the deposit of an "ill defined or
formless" mass." Plaintiff's claims were located as lode
claims. At trial plaintiff introduced samples taken from
some of them. The parties and the trial court both assumed
that the lode law was applicable to the deposit. The precise
question was whether plaintiff's purported discovery was a
proper lode discovery, i.e., of valuable mineral "in a lead, lode,
ledge or vein or rock in place."'" Finding that the evidence
did not show that plaintiff's samples came from a vein or
rock in place, the trial court found against the plaintiff on
the point. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted
that no question was raised by the parties as to the trial
court's interpretation of the necessity for showing a discovery
of mineral in rock in place and concluded, therefore, that the
appeal did not require any detailed definition of the word
lode.82 The court concluded that the uranium deposits were
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957), noted in 13 Wyo. L.J. 43 (1958).
318 P.2d at 377n.4.
Id. at 378n.4.
Id. at 376.
The word has justifiably been the subject of some confusion. Title 30 U.S.C.
§ 23 (1964) refers to "mining claims upon veins or lodes of quartz or other
rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable deposits." (Emphasis added.) Title 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964) refers to
"mining locations made on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge." (Emphasis
added.) These are the only statutory definitions. Yet they are determinative of whether a given deposit is locatable as a lode and, if so, what
constitutes a valid lode discovery. Thus in Jefferson-Montana Copper
Mines Co., 41 Interior Dec. 320 (1912), it was held that a lode discovery
must be (1) of a vein or lode of rock in place (2) bearing valuable mineral
in the rock. In United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 240 F. 996 (D. Wyo. 1916),
Judge Riner said that no valid location of a lode claim may be made until
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locatable as lodes and that plaintiff, relying on a discovery
of uranium within the sandstone layers, was obligated to
identify its discovery samples as having been taken therefrom, i.e., from a "vein or rock in place." On this basis the
court found that the plaintiff's evidence showed valid lode
discoveries on certain claims but not on others and it accordingly reversed the trial court's decision as to those claims
on which a discovery was shown.
As the court properly observed, no issue was raised in
Globe as to the appropriate form of location of uranium
claims such as those there considered. The parties and trial
court assumed the ground was locatable as lodes. But it is
apparent that had it been contested and decided that the
ground was placer ground, a different issue would have been
after there has been a discovery of a vein or lode containing mineral
within the limits of the claim. He went on to say that since mere indications of mineral do not suffice, and since finding mineral itself is not a
discovery, but a mere indication, a true lode discovery must be of mineral
in rock in place as distinguished from float rock.
Some ambiguity exists in the federal statutes concerning just what
it is that must be "in place." At one time the rule that a lode discovery
had to be of a (1) vein or lode of rock in place (2) bearing valuable
mineral in the rock apparently caused some authorities to believe that
deposits of minerals like limestone were peculiarly placer in nature and
should be located as placers. Lindley stated:
Lands containing limestone used for fluxing in metallurgical operations, or for the purpose of manufacturing the lime of commerce, have
been held to be subject to entry under the placer laws. Deposits of this
character although essentially in place, are locatable under the placer
laws if they do not contain other mineral or valuable deposits. They
are considered "rock in place" but not a "vein or lode of quartz or
other rock in place bearing gold . . . or other valuable deposits."
2 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 421 (3d ed. 1914): citing Henderson v. Fulton, 35
Interior Dec. 652 (1907), Roy McDonald, 40 Interior Dec. 7 (1911).
Lindley's view was probably correct at the time. Henderson v. Fulton so
indicates and even suggests that marble and limestone may be claimed
only by placer location. In that case the Secretary had difficulty with the
language of the lode statute "rock in place bearing . . . valuable deposits."
He said that a marble deposit was clearly in place, but in no sense did it
bear mineral. It was not a host rock, but the mineral itself. He went on
to say that the lode statute contemplated lode locations either for the
enumerated valuable minerals, gold, silver, etc., or for some host rock
in place which bore those minerals. Hence, marble, neither being one of
the enumerated minerals nor bearing any of them, had to be located as a
placer, notwithstanding its occurrence in lode or ledge formation. An earlier
departmental ruling in Shepherd v. Bird, 17 L.D. 82 (1893), had similarly
suggested that limestone was open only to placer entry. But subsequently
in two departmental rulings the government reversed Henderson v. Fulton
and Shepherd v. Bird to the extent that they required such deposits to be
located as placers. In Big Pine Mining Corp., 53 Interior Dec. 410 (1931),
the Interior Department said that even if the limestone there considered
had occurred in deposits which were feasible to mine, the evidence showed
that they were in lode formation, and because they had been located as
placers, the claims were invalid. One year later, in Vivia Hemphill, 54
Interior Dec. 80 (1932), the Department announced the rule which exists
today. Limestone, if present in good quality, is a mineral. If it occurs in
lode or vein or ledge formation it is locatable as a lode claim. If it occurs
in loose or scattered form, it is locatable as a placer.
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presented as to plaintiff's discovery, for there is no requirement that a placer discovery be made of mineral in rock in
place.3 But, because of the posture of the case, no readily
apparent basis existed for the court to examine what it
undoubtedly considered a crucial threshold question-are
uranium deposits of the type involved in Globe to be located
as lodes or as placers ?
Courts are ordinarily reluctant to express their views
as to matters neither raised by the parties nor necessary
to decision. Yet, the Globe court detected in the unraised
threshold question an important example of the increasingly
recurrent difficulties experienced in recent years by miners
who must attempt to comply with the mining law in the context of physical and economic facts unanticipated by it. Little
difficulty confronted the Nineteenth Century miner who set
out to locate a lode claim upon a vein of gold or silver lying
exposed or near the surface with a readily discernible strike
and dip. Lode claims were defined by Congress with his
situation in mind. But how are the fundamental, definitional
problems of a modern mining industry dealing with low
grade, amorphous mineral deposits, which often occur at
considerable depth, to be resolved? As the court observed
in Globe:"'
A commonly used definition of a lode is "a body
of mineral, or mineral-bearing rock, within defined
boundaries in the general mass of the mountain."
1 Lindley on Mines, 3d ed., p. 656. This definition
has been most often applied to discussions of primary
deposits of minerals. It is significant that at the
time of the enactment of R.S. § 2320 (1878) those
minerals in which this Nation was most interested
83. See 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964); In United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 240 F. 996
(D. Wyo. 1916), a case involving oil placers, Judge Riner distinguished
between lodes and placers. He stated that the term "veins" or "lodes" means
lines or aggregations of mineral imbedded in quartz or other rock in place,
whereas the term "placer" applies to ground within definite boundaries
wihch contains mineral or valuable deposits not in place. It was argued in
that case that no location of a petroleum placer could be made until the
discovery of the vein or deposit from which the oil is drawn was shown.
Pointing out that a placer claim may be located for the mineral rather than
for mineral in rock in place, Judge Riner rejected the notion, spawned in
Bay v. Oklahoma Southern Gas, Oil & Mining Co., 13 Okla, 425, 73 P.936
(1903), that there must be a discovery in the case of oil within the oil
bearing sands. The holding would of course be applicable to placer claims
for minerals other than oil, and it points up the distinction between lodes
and placers generally.
84. 318 P.2d 373, 378n.4. (1957).
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often occurred in fissures and along weak lines in
rock. For that reason, many decisions have emphasized the fact that a vein or lode must have "well
defined boundaries." Some courts recognized that
many ore deposits possessed all the essential attributes of lodes even though they did not have well
defined boundaries in the original sense. However,
the words "well defined boundaries" became so
firmly ensconced in the legal vocabulary that they
often haunted the decisions. Today, the economic
necessity of modern civilization has created a need
for minerals which by geologic chance frequently
occur in ill defined or formless masses.
Then the court, in an extraordinary display of judicial responsiveness to the presence of a difficult, but unlitigated question,
chose to offer its guidance in the troublesome area :8"
Uncertainty presently exists regarding the type
of claim by which a 'disseminated uranium deposit
of epigenetic origin should be located . . . . Ambiguity in legal interpretations regarding the location
of mining claims for this apparently vital mineral
may be more than merely frustrating and expensive
to well-intentioned prospectors. It may seriously
retard a crucial industry by undue litigation, ultimately forcing a new method of mining development
to be adopted by legislative action-such as the
withdrawal of public land from mineral entry and
the reservation of same for acquisition by lease, as
is presently done with petroleum. Whether or not
this might be 'desirable is not for judicial decision
but is a matter for legislative determination. Meanwhile, there could be irreparable loss, both public
and private. Accordingly, we would perhaps be
remiss if we did not express our views on the subject.
The lode-placer distinction with which the court thus decided
to come to grips has had a history of complexity beginning
with the very early cases decided following enactment of
the mining law."0
The 'definition of the terms "lode" and "placer" as
they appear in the Federal statutes are mutually exclusive.
85. Id. at 377-378n.4.
86. Difficulties with the problem continue unabated in the recent cases. See,
e.g., Bowen v. Chemi-Cote Perlite Corp., 423 P.2d 104 (Ariz. App. 1967),
rev'd, 432 P.2d 435 (Ariz. 1967). See also Note, 15 Wyo. L.J. 176 (1961).
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Lode deposits are said to occur in veins, lodes, or ledges."
Placer deposits are all deposits other than those occurring
in veins, lodes, or ledges. 8 A placer has been defined "as
a deposit of valuable mineral found in particles in alluvium
or diluvium, or beds of streams. " In Reynolds v. Iron Silver
Mining Co., the court said :90

Placer mines, those said by the statute to include
all other deposits of mineral matter, are those in
which this mineral is generally found in the softer
material which covers the earth's surface, and not
among the rocks beneath.
In Northern Pac. R.R. v. Soderberg, it said,91 "Placers are
merely superficial deposits occupying the beds of ancient
rivers or valleys, washed down from some vein or lode."
In contrast, the terms lode, vein or ledge, which are used more
or less synonomously in the mining law, are generally thought
to refer to mineral deposits which are found "in place", i.e.,
in the place of their source or origin. In Eureka Consol.
Mining Co. v. Richmond Mining Co.,"2 Dr. Raymond, testifying as an expert witness, explains the origin of the word
"lode" as follows:98
The miners made the definition first. As used by
miners, before being defined by any authority, the
term "lode" simply meant that formation by which
the miner could be lead or guided. It is an alteration
of the verb "lead", and whatever the miner could
follow, expecting to find ore, was his lode. Some
formation within which he could find ore, and out
of which he could not expect to find ore, was his lode.
The classic judicial definition of the term lode is found
in the Eureka case, in which Mr. Justice Field94 said of the
87. 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
88. 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). The term placer was the name given by the
Spaniards to auriferous gravels. It has become a generic term in which
all forms of deposit other than those occurring in lodes are popularly
included. See 2 C. LINDLEY, MINES, § 419, at 983 (3d ed. 1914).
89. Id.

90. 116 U.S. 687, 695 (1886).
91. 188 U.S. 526, 532 (1903).
92. 4 Sawy. 302, 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 578, 8 F.Cas. 819 (No. 4548) (C.C.D. Nev.
1881), aff'd, 103 U.S. 839 (1881).
93. As quoted in 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 289, at 641 (3d ed. 1914). For a
similar use of the word "lead" see Sherlock v. Leighton, 9 Wyo. 297, 63
P.580 (1901).
94. He was then Judge of the Circuit Court for the District of Nevada.
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lode and placer statutes :"
Those acts were not drawn by geologists or for geologists; they were not framed in the interest of science,
and consequently with scientific accuracy in the use
of terms. They were framed for the protection of
miners in the claims which they had located and
developed, and should receive such a construction as
will carry out this purpose. The use of the terms
"vein" and "lode" in connection with each other in
the Act of 1866, and their use in connection with the
term "ledge" in the Act of 1872, would seem to indicate that it was the object of the legislator to avoid
any limitation in the application of the Acts, which
a scientific definition of any one of these terms
might impose. It is difficult to give any definition
of the term as understood and used in the Acts of
Congress, which will not be subject to criticism. A
fissure in the earth's crust, an opening in its rocks
and strata made by some force of nature, in which
the mineral is deposited, would seem to be essential
to the definition of a lode, in the judgment of geologists. But to the practical miner, the fissure and
its walls are only of importance as indicating the
boundaries within which he may look for and reasonably expect to find the ore he seeks. A continuous
body of mineralized rock lying within any other welldefined boundaries on the earth's surface and under
it, would equally constitute, in his eyes, a lode. We
are of opinion, therefore, that the term as used in
the Acts of Congress is applicable to any zone or
belt of mineralized rock lying within boundaries
clearly separating it from the neighboring rocks.
Notwithstanding the imposing authority of these definitions, it has in recent years come to be recognized that not
all mineral deposits occur in the simple forms envisaged
by the draftsmen of the statutes. 6 The statutory and early
judicial definitions were essentially simplistic. The terms
95. The Eureka definition is cited and quoted virtually everywhere the question
is discussed. In Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Cheesman, 116 U.S. 530, 533-34
(1886), Mr. Justice Miller said of it:
This definition has received repeated commendation in other cases,
especially in Stevens v. Williams, I McCrary 480, 488 where a shorter
definition by Judge Hallett, of the Colorado Circuit Court, is also
approved to wit: "In general, it may be said, that a lode or vein is
a body of mineral, or mineral body of rocks, within defined boundaries,
in the general mass of the mountain."
96. In Moulton Mining Co. v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 23 F.2d 811, 814
(9th Cir. 1928), the court said:
We are guided by the well-recognized knowledge that in the complexities of lodes, with indefinite and irregular walls, while the mineral
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were not scientific terms. They were miner's terms. A lode
was simply a "lead." Consistent therewith, a lode was usually
defined as a body of mineral, or mineral-bearing rock, within
defined boundaries, in the general mass of the mountain. 7
The definition was adequate and workable for it was within
the understanding of the miner and was readily applicable
to the types of deposits generally found and claimed at the
time. In short, it made common sense to the miner."
The difficulty with the "comion sense" approach to the
definition of a lode becomes apparent upon reading the facts
presented in the Globe case. The uranium deposits simply
did not conform with the various alternatives of configuration generally known to the miners by whom and for whom
the old definitions were made. The Wyoming court, noting
association of rock in place is an essential element in the definition, the
nature of the material, the form of the deposit, and the character of
(Citations).
the boundaries are often variant ....
Even as early as 1914 Lindley remarked:
Of course, there are irregular mineral deposits departing widely in
their characteristics from the typical or ideal vein which seems to have
been in the mind of the framer of the Act of 1872 . .. [in] my opinion,
great difficulty will be experienced in any attempt to apply the existing
law to them.
1 C. LINDLEY, MINES, § 308, at 683 (3d ed. 1914).
97. See Hyman v. Wheeler, 29 F. 347 (C.C.D. Colo. 1886), citing the Eureka
case.
98. In a circular which was issued to surveyors-general, registers and receivers
by Commissioner Drummond of the General Land Office in 1873, the Commissioner concluded that to determine whether a mineral deposit is a lode,
one should look to the statute rather than to the definitions of geologists,
and that the statute is to be construed in the light of common usage of the
"lode" or "vein" rather than upon the basis of scientific definition. See
Henderson v. Fulton, 35 Interior Dec. 652 (1907); 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES
§ 299, at 667-668 (3d ed. 1914). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said
in Duffield v. San Francisco Chem. Co., 205 F. 480 (9th Cir. 1913), that
a miner need not know the origin or geologic history of the area. If to
a miner the mineral deposit is one which is in rock "in place" within the
general mass of the mountain, then the purpose and requirements of the
statute are met. In McMullin v. Magnuson, 102 Colo. 230, 78 P.2d 964
(1938), the Colorado Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
disputed ground was subject to a lode location or whether a subsequent
placer locator might prevail upon the theory that the pegmatite contained
in the ground was locatable only as a placer. The placer locators argued
that pegmatite, because of the process of its creation, i.e., by the projection
of molten rock material originating within the earth into its present
position where it later cooled and solidified, is not a vein or lode in a strict
geological sense, but is a dike, or even a mineralized portion of a mass
of country rock which is subject to location only under the placer laws.
The court rejected the argument:
Interesting as is this theory, and without reference to its soundness
from a geological standpoint, its weakness as an argument here lies
in the circumstance that by no statute or judicial pronouncement is
the origin or method of formation of a mineral body controlling in
determining whether the ground is subject to location as a lode or
placer. 102 Colo. at 239, 78 P.2d at 969 (1938).
Accord, Jones v. Prospect Mtn. Tunnel Co., 21 Nev. 339, 31 P.642 (1892).
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(1) that fairly uniform geological definitions are available,"9
and (2) that the earlier decisions relied on rigid, nontechnical definitions,"' concluded :'O"such rigid definitions
cannot be of universal application but rather must be tempered

by scientific findings as to the nature of the deposits under
consideration." If the court's statement appears to be contrary to Mr. Justice Field's declaration that" 2 "those acts
were not drawn by geologists or for geologists; they were not
framed in the interest of science, and consequently with scientific accuracy in the use of terms. They were framed for the
protection of miners... ," a moment's reflection should reveal
that the Wyoming court has done no more than recognize
that the modern miner is of necessity partly scientist and
partly miner. Unlike its historic predecessor, today's mining
company employs teams of geologists, and the art of prospecting has become the science of prospecting. It is, therefore, appropriate that the classic distinction between lode and
placer should be made upon criteria "tempered by scientific
findings as to the nature of the deposits under consideration. '",10
99. 318 P.2d at 378n.4:
Such definitions by various authors writing on geological subjects
vary to some extent but in general are remarkably uniform, and we
think may be fairly summarized as: A placer is a deposit of heavy
minerals concentrated mechanically; a veit is a deposit of minerals
formed in weaknesses in the earth's crust either by injection of molten
rock or by water solution moving through openings and depositing
minerals in and along such openings or in replacement of materials
already there; a lode is a portion of the earth containing several veins
spaced closely enough together so that all of them together with the
intervening rock can be mined as a unit.
See generally Longwell and Flint, Introduction to Physical Geology, 1955,
p. 382; Emmons, Thiel, Stauffer, and Allison, Geology: Principles and
Processes, 4th ed., p. 597; and Longwell, Knopf and Flint, Physical Geology,
3rd ed., p. 531.
100. 318 P.2d at 378n.4:
These geological definitions indicate that the basic characteristic of
a vein is the origin of the deposit contained therein. However, the earlier
decisions usually dealt with minerals which by nature tended to form
largely in cracks and crevices so that courts and administrative agencies
found no occasion to consider the origin of the mineral as important
but instead relied entirely on its form as being confined within narrow,
definite boundaries. They often used such rigid definitions of lode
as "mineral lying within well defined seams or fissures in the surrounding rock," 36 Am. Jur., Mines and Minerals § 70, or "any zone
or belt of mineralized rock lying within boundaries clearly separating
it from the neighboring rock," 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 3, at
p. 31-sometimes saying, "The critical test is the manner in which
the deposit occurs rather than the origin of the deposit," U.S. Gypsum
Co., 60 I.D. 24, 25.
101. 318 P.2d at 378n.4.
102. See, supra note 95 and accompanying text.
103. See, supra note 101.
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The Globe court correctly noted that under traditional
doctrine the critical test for determining whether a deposit
was a lode or placer was the manner or form in which it
The test emphasized the
occurs rather than its origin.'
form of the deposit and contemplated that a lode would be
readily recognized by its confinement within definite boundaries of "country rock." In Stevens v. Williams, Judge Hallett
said :...
It is the surrounding mass of country rock; it
is that which encloses the lode, rather than the
material of which it is composed, which gives it its
character. So that, even if it be true, as counsel has
stated in the course of their arguments, that this
is mere sand, is a loose and friable material, which
cannot be called rock, in the strict definition of the
woid-if that be true, it does not affect the character
of the lode. If it were all of that character, it would
still be a vein or lode in place if the wall of each
side, the part which holds the lode, is fixed and
immovable.
In Stevens v. Gill, he said :10
The act of congress speaks of veins or lodes in
place, by which, according to our interpretation, it
is required that the vein, or lode, shall be in the
general mass of the mountain. It may not be on the
surface or covered only by movable parts, called
slide, or 'debris. But if it is in the general mass of
the mountain, although the enclosing rocks may have
sustained fracture and dislocation in the general
movement of the country, it is in place.
These statements have been generally accepted as expository
of the law. In addition, it has occasionally been noted that
the relative hardness or softness of the surrounding rock is
a factor in determining whether or not the mineral embraced
is "in place."" 7 The courts have expected to find that softer
rocks will occur near the surface while harder rocks will
occur at greater depth. Thus the combination of 'depth and
hardness of the country rock have been taken as indicators,
perhaps not only of the nature of the deposit, but also of the
104.
105.
106.
107.

Citing U. S. Gypsum Co., 60 Interior Dec. 24, 25 (1947).
1 Morr. Min. Rep. 557, F. Cas. No. 13,414 (C.C.D Colo. 1879).
1 Morr. Min. Rep. 576, 580, F. Cas. No. 13,398 (C.C.D. Colo. 1879).
Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 116 U.S. 687, 695 (1886).
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ease or difficulty with which it might be mined at the surface
by placer methods." 8
It is usually said that mineral-bearing rock is different
in kind from the surrounding country rock, but it is clear
that such need not be the case.'
Nevertheless, the chances
for a determination of the existence of a lode would seem
to be greatly enhanced where the evidence shows that the
country rock is barren.
Although much attention has been devoted to the form
of the deposit as imposed upon it by the form of the surrounding country rock, much has also been said concerning
the character or form of the mineralized zone itself in connection with classifying mineral deposits as lodes or placers.
It is most frequently said that the deposit must have "trend"
or "continuity.""..
Where there has been doubt as to the
continuity of the deposit or the existence of a true "body,"
the courts have sometimes required location for such minerals
as placers."'
Of course, if the ore body and the surrounding country
rock each possess distinguishing characteristics, i.e., if the
country rock is barren and embraces a "body" of mineralized
rock which itself possesses continuity, there will, of necessity,
be a zone of contact between the mineral and the country
rock. In ideal form the contact is clearly visible. The standard
definitions, of course, describe such an idealized situation.
Thus, in Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Cheesman, it was said :"'
"the term [lode] is applicable to any zone or belt of mineralized rock lying within boundaries clearly separatingit from
the neighboring rock." But it has been held that the contact
zone need not be visible and that its presence may be determined by assay and analysis."'
108. Titanium Actynite Industries v. McLennan, 272 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1959).
109. Henderson v. Fulton, 35 Interior Dec. 652 (1907).
110. See Titanium Actynite Industries v. McLennan, 272 F.2d 667 (10th Cir.
1959). See also Pepperdine v. Keys, 198 Cal. App. 2d 25, 17 Cal. Rptr. 709,
715 (1962). Statements of this kind would appear to be merely the reverse
of the requirement that the surrounding country rock be barren.
111. See Veale v. Piercy, 206 Cal. App. 2d 557, 24 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1962), where
the court considered a deposit of dolomite, and having found that it occurred
in a conglomerate, diffused mass stated that there was no vein or lode and
that the proper form of location was placer.
112. 116 U.S. 529, 534 (1886).
113. Beals v. Cone, 27 Colo. 473, 62 P.948 (1900); Henderson v. Fulton, 35
Interior Dec. 652 (1907).
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Three principal factors determinative of the existence
of a lode emerge from this considerable body of authorities:
(1) the character of the surrounding country rock; (2) the
form, trend or continuity of the orebody itself; and (3)the
existence of a reasonable definition or boundary between the
mineralized zone and the country rock. From one case to the
next the factors tend to recede or emerge individually as the
facts warrant, making it difficult to assign to them an order
of importance. But the foregoing illustrations make clear
that courts have tended to concentrate on the mode of occurrence, rather than some intrinsic quality of a mineral deposit
which might determine the manner in which it should be
located.
The court in Globe rejected such "rigid definitions,"
noting that "the nature of the material, the form of the
deposit, and the character of the boundaries are often variant.""' 4 The court said first that structural boundaries are
not always necessary to constitute a vein or lode, and then :"
[V]arious portions of a mineral-bearing area coming from the same general source and found to have
been created by the same processes of deposit from
solution constitute a lode (rock in place) for the
purpose of locating mining claims even though they
may be formless and are not enclosed by definite
boundaries.
Thus, beginning with the premise that the uranium deposits
of the type located as lodes in the Wind River formation
lack the essential characteristics of rock in place under the
usual or historic definitions related to form, continuity and
enclosure of ore bodies, the court (1) relied on what it
understood to be a scientific definition, according to which
the terms vein and lode may include somewhat vaguely defined
"deposits" within a general area of mineralization formed,
perhaps, by ground water deposition from solution, and (2)
declared that such deposits are, therefore, also lodes or rock
in place within the meaning of the mining law.
The Globe court's premise, rationale and conclusion raise
318 P.2d at 379n.4. It should be noted that the court in referring to the
scientific ("geological") definition of placers stated: "A placer is a deposit
of heavy minerals concentrated mechanically . . . ." Id. at 378n.4.
115. Id.
114.
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several interesting questions. First, to what extent was its
characterization of such uranium deposits as lodes a substantial departure from prior law? Certainly the classic
statements of what constitutes a lode would not appear to
permit inclusion of a formless mass without boundaries."'
But, on the other hand, it is demonstrable that the classic
definitions have not proved to be so inflexible as to prevent
lode locations for other minerals having some if not all the
characteristics of the Wind River uranium deposits. Consider, for example, the following description of the horizontal,
blanket limestone replacement deposits of the Leadville District, located and upheld as lodes :.17
[T]he lower surface is ill-defined and irregular,
there being a gradual transition from ore into unaltered limestone, the former extending to varying
depths from the surface, and even occupying at
times the entire thickness of the blue limestone.
The material of which they were composed was
not a deposit in a pre-existing cavity in the rock,
but the solutions, which carried them, gradually dissolved out the original rock material and left the
ore or vein material in its place ....
Notable similarities in the characteristics of the Leadville
blanket veins and the deposits of the Wind River formation,
such as the horizontal position of the beds, a gradual transition from ore into a zone of little or no mineralization, and,
perhaps, the mode of 'deposition from solution, suggest that
these characteristics do not, of themselves, militate against a
finding under the familiar legal definitions that the deposits
are properly locatable as lodes rather than placers. Locations
of the Leadville deposits as lodes were upheld notwithstanding
that in some of them at least, the ore was found on the surface
or covered only by the superficial mass of slide, debris, detritus, or movable materials distinguishable from the general
mass of the mountain."' What was crucial to their lode
character was that the beds themselves were found to lie in
116. See the quotation from Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Cheesman, supra, note
112, emphasizing the requirement of a body of mineral within defined
boundaries; cf. 1 C. LINDLEY, supra, note 96.
117. EMMONS, GEOLOGY AND MINING INDUSTRY OF LEADviLLE, at 375, 378, quoted
in 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 300, at 670 (3d ed. 1914).
118. 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 300, at 669 (3d ed. 1914).
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fixed position in the general mass of country rock."' They
were thus "in place."' 2 It is submitted that the same might
be said of the Wind River formation, generally, so that portions of the formation, to the extent that they are mineralized,
might accurately be classified as lodes, whatever their mode
of deposition.'21 As against the objection that the mineralized
portions of the formation are formless and without ascertainable boundaries, two solutions appear. First, it was
suggested in the Ula Uranium... case that the boundary of
the deposit may be fixed by the impoverishment of the mass
beyond the limits of profitable extraction. This solution
appears to be a practical one for its criterion is one which
the miner himself is vitally interested in determining. 2 '
Second, the depth in the Wind River formation at which
ore is found, or, at least, above which no ore is found has
apparently been established by reference to the known water
table. 2 ' This information would seem to have significant
value as a boundary marker. Whether such lode indicators
were not brought to its attention or whether it merely declined
to consider them to be of sufficient importance, the court's
adoption of its premise in Globe that the nature of the uranium
119. Id. § 301, at 671.
120. Excluding the wash, slide, or debris, on the surface of the mountain, all
things in the mass of the mountain are in place. Iron Silver Mining Co. v.
Cheesman, 116 U.S. 529, 537 (1886).
121. Cf., Jones v. Prospect Mtn. Tunnel Co., 21 Nev. 339, 351, 31 P.642, 645
(1892). To be compared as to classification of an entire formation as
"in place" so as to enable lode characterization of mineral portions thereof
are the limestone cases. Lindley observed of limestone beds that they were
essentially in place, but that unless they contained some other mineral or
valuable deposits within the enumeration in 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964), they
were not mineral bearing rock in place, and should therefore be located as
placers. This was the rule at one time. C. LINDLEY, supra note 118, at ----See also Columbia Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co., 13 Wyo. 244, 79 P.385 (1905). But in Vivia Hemphill, 54 Interior
Dec. 80 (1932), it was announced that limestone beds, to the extent that
they were valuable, were themselves mineral and, being in place, were
locatable as lodes. Cf. Bowen v. Chemi-Cote Perlite Corp., 423 P.2d 104,
117 (Ariz. App. 1967) rev'd on other grounds, 432 P.2d 435 (Ariz. 1967).
122. Ula Uranium, Inc. v. Allen, Unreported Mem. Dec. (Dist. Ct., San Juan
Co., Utah, Oct. 6, 1956), quoted in Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo.
17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957).
123. It should be noted, however, that profitable extraction is not the test of
a discovery of valuable mineral. See, e.g., Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S.
313, 322 (1905); Adams v. United States, 318 F.2d 861, 870 (9th Cir.
1963) ; Denison v. Udall, 248 F. Supp. 942 (D. Ariz. 1965); United States
v. Mouat, 61 Interior Dec. 289, 293 (1954); Castle v. Womble, 19 Interior
Dec. 455, 457 (1894). Hence, the Ula Uranium test imposes a more stringent
requirement on the claimant to show the existence of a lode, than is traditionally required for discovery. The Ula Uranium test would be satisfactory if the boundaries were delineated by such impoverishment as would
fail to meet the test of Castle v. Womble for discovery.
124. Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1960).
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deposits required some substantial departure from familiar
rules in order to characterize them as lodes seems in retrospect to have been somewhat hasty and unnecessary. Unfortunately, the premise that the deposits were not in lode formation under standard, existing criteria required the court's
ultimate conclusion that the deposits were lodes to be based
on other criteria. The result may have been the creation of
new and equally difficult problems. It would appear from
the quoted dictum that a formless mineralized area lacking
boundaries may be held or deemed to be in place and, hence,
a lode if it comes from one general source and was created
by one process of deposit from solution. Since, by definition,
the resulting constructive "lode" is formless and boundless,
one wonders how the lode claimant may show, as the court
indicated he must, that his samples come from within the lode,
that is, from within rock in place.
There was testimony in Globe that at least some of
plaintiff's samples were taken from "rock in place," and
"mineralization in place." The court found the evidence to
be uncontradicted and took it as conclusive proof of plaintiff's
discovery of secondary uranium in a vein or rock in place, as
to the particular claims covered in the testimony. But what
would have been the result if the lode claimant's evidence
had been contradicted? By the nature of the court's characterization of the deposit as formless and without boundaries,
it would appear to be impossible to show that samples were
taken either from within or without the "lode." A logically
consistent extension of the court's conclusion produces equally
impossible alternatives for a trial court. Either (1) samples
taken from anywhere within the lode claim are admissible
and suffice to prove a lode discovery (a conclusion the Globe
court specifically rejected) 12 5 or (2) samples must be shown
to have been taken from within the boundaries of a lode
which by hypothesis has no definite boundaries.1 2
125. 318 P.2d at 377n.3:
Plaintiff thus relying upon the discovery of uranium within the sandstone layers was obligated to identify the discovery samples as having
been taken therefrom and if he failed to do so could not complain of
the court's ruling that the samples were not shown to have been
taken from a "vein or rock in place."
126. The court's emphasis that samples must be shown to have been taken from
"within the sandstone layers," supra note 125, rather than from the lode
or deposit itself, implicitly recognizes that what is "in place" is the sandstone formation, not the uranium deposit, and permits the claimant's proof
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Other problems may exist as well. Factors not discussed
by the Globe court may either assist in the lode-placer determination or make it more difficult. An example is the size
of the mineralized area. If it is extensive, that fact may
indicate that it is locatable as a placer, for the area required
to cover an orebody with lode locations has been a matter
which has troubled courts considering the question since the
Globe decision. Pepperdine v. Keys... involved a gypsum
deposit covering an area of five square miles. The California
court took into account the extensive size of the deposit in
holding that it should be located as a placer. Similarly, in
Titanium Actynite Industries v. McLennan,2 ' where the
exterior boundaries of the area contested by lode and placer
claimants covered eight to ten square miles, the size of the
mineralized zone was a factor which the court considered
in holding that it was placer ground. The court reviewed
the statutes and the definitions set out in the older cases.
Then it said :1"9

It is quite evident here that plaintiffs' claim
covered no well-defined veins or lode as those terms
are ordinarily used, unless it can be said that the
entire area was a single lode. The record discloses
that we are dealing with a large, shapeless, closely
grained mass of ore, which, with the possible exception of the disintegrated top portion, is "in place"
in the sense that it is in a fixed position. However,
the mass extends over several miles of country and
has no known dimension of boundaries and none of
the ordinary lode characteristics, not even as to the
method of recovering the minerals. The theory that
the entire mass is a lode in place with undetermined
boundaries would create a single lode covering somewhere between 8 to 12 square miles.
to rest on this premise. An explicit recognition that the formation is in
place and that mineral taken therefrom is therefore taken from a lode
would have obviated the initial difficulties with which the court struggled
in concluding that disseminated, epigenetic uranium deposits were in place,
even though formless and without boundaries. The implicit recognition in
the form of permissiveness in proof of discovery of mineral in rock in place
by reference to its position in the sandstone inconsistently concedes that
the deposit, i.e., the mineralized portions of the sandstone layers, need not
be in place, notwithstanding the somewhat lengthy discussion which concludes
that the deposit constitutes a lode (rock in place). This is in fact what the
court indicated in Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, supra note
124, at 385, when it said: "The Upper Wind River formation is rock in
place and where mineralization occurs it is a lode."
127. 198 Cal. App. 2d 25, 17 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1962).
128. 272 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1959).
129. Id. at 671 [Emphasis added].
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Another example is the relative adaptability of conventional
lode and placer methods to mining the deposit. Apparently
the Globe court had no evidence of this sort before it, but
another have been and should be perindications one way or 130
courts.
the
with
suasive
In the final analysis perhaps the choice of the first
locator should weigh heavily in the 'determination, at least
as against subsequent locators. We have earlier suggested" 1
that it may be unfair to place the burden of mistake on the
locator who must initially decide what form of location is
appropriate to a given deposit. It seems especially so in
cases in which the courts themselves have difficulty in determining the question. One student of the matter has said :132
If the first locator, from knowledge and information
available to him at the time of claiming a given area,
could reasonably believe that the deposit was lode
in character, then his right of possession as against
a subsequent placer locator, should be sustained even
though there should be a conflict of opinion between
other prospectors or between experts as to the
character of the deposit.
Of course, there may always be problems connected with the
bona fides of the first locator's choice,13 but such problems
are neither novel nor incapable of resolution in litigation.
The choice of the first locator was not made an issue in
Globe. Indeed, both parties there assumed the lode law was
applicable. But their choice is nevertheless felt in a case
where a decision that mineral ground such as that claimed
130. In United States v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 128 U.S. 673 (1888), the Supreme
Court noted that placer deposits were those which are not "in place" but
are in a loose state and may be collected by washing. Judge Van Fleet in
Duffield v. San Francisco Chem. Co., 198 F. 942 (D. Idaho 1912) [reversed
on other grounds, 205 F.480J suggested that one of the characteristics of
a lode is that it is mined by blasting. In Titanium Actynite Industries v.
McLennan, supra, Judge Pickett noted, "the evidence is without conflict
that the minerals can best be mined by traditional placer methods."
131. See text at notes 69-71 supra.
132. Note, 15 Wyo. L. J. 176, 178 (1961).
133. We suspect such problems might be more likely to arise where the first
locator is an association and has made placer entry under 30 U.S.C. § 36
(1964). The courts' familiarity with problems of this sort is evidenced
by a relatively well developed body of law, both statutory and decisional.
See 30 U.S.C. § 36 (1964). See qererally, United States v. ChanslorCanfield Midway Oil Co., 266 F.142 (S.D. Cal. 1918); Durant v. Corbin,
94 F.382 (C.C.D. Wash. 1899); Mitchell v. Cline, 84 Cal. 409, 24 P. 164
(1890).
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was placer ground would have left both parties with the
wrong kind of claims.
In summary, the characterization of any given mineral
deposit as subject to one form of location as opposed to
another should be dependent upon a number of factors: (1)
Whether the area is generally considered by miners to be
lode territory or placer territory; (2) whether conventional
lode or placer mining methods are well-adapted to extracting
the minerals involved; (3) the character of the surrounding
country rock; (4) the character or substance of the mineral
body; (5) the existence of a reasonable definition or boundary
between the mineralized zone and the surrounding country
rock; and (6) the size of the mineralized body and the depth
at which it is found. While the Wyoming Supreme Court
in a landmark decision has dealt with some of these factors
and has thereby undoubtedly and commendably anticipated
and thus forestalled expensive litigation in some instances,
its treatment of the subject should be regarded as something
less than a final solution admitting of no exception or modification, particularly where additional factors not considered
by the court may exist.
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